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Foreword by Paul Goggins MP, Chair
Task Force on Child Protection on the
Internet.
I am delighted to launch this good practice guidance for
moderation of interactive services for children on behalf of the
Task Force on Child Protection on the Internet.
The Task Force was established in 2001 and brings together representatives of the
internet industry, mobile phone companies, law enforcement, the children’s charities and
others, who work together to make the Internet a safer place for children, without
diminishing their enjoyment of the exciting opportunities which it offers.  Building on this
partnership, the Task Force has run several successful education and awareness
campaigns.  It also assisted the Government in preparing a new offence of meeting a child
following sexual grooming, which was introduced in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. This
has helped to tackle public concerns about misuse of the Internet by paedophiles.  Also in
2003, the Task Force published models of good practice and guidance for the internet
industry to consider when providing chat services, instant messaging and web based
services, and is working on a kitemark standard for rating, filtering and monitoring
software.     
This guidance is another important step towards improving child protection standards
online.  It is intended for use by providers of public interactive communication services
aimed at or likely to attract children.  This is a rapidly developing area of online activity
where children may be at risk from undesirable contact or behaviour and moderation plays
a crucial role in making children safer.  
The guidance offers advice to service providers for the first time on assessing potential
risks to children, deciding whether moderation is necessary and, if so, what kind of
moderation.  It also sets out good practice in respect of the recruitment, selection and
training of moderators and covers the relevant areas of the criminal law.
The document is intended to be of practical help and I believe it is an invaluable guide for
any organisation already providing or considering whether to provide interactive services
geared towards children.  It will also be of interest to parents and carers who wish to know
more about moderated services.  It represents a substantial achievement on the part of
those who have contributed their time and expertise to bring together the best available
advice on this subject.
I strongly recommend the guidance and urge providers of interactive services to consider
how the recommendations in this document can be applied to their services.
Foreword
2
This guidance has been produced in response to public concern about the safety of
children using interactive communication services, such as the Internet. While these
services offer huge opportunities for children to communicate and learn, experience has
shown that there are some individuals who will use them to contact children in order to
“groom” and abuse them.  It is, therefore, important to consider child safety issues when
providing these types of services. There are a number of tools and processes that can be
implemented to address child safety concerns, one of which is moderation. 
Moderation allows a person, or technical filter, to review content posted by users.  This
document gives a framework to help providers of ‘virtual public space’ offer a safer
environment for children.
The guidance applies to public interactive communication services through which
individuals can make contact and exchange personal information with other users in a
virtual public “space” such as, but not limited to:
• internet chat rooms, message boards, mobile chat services, TV ‘text to screen’
services, on-line games with chat or messaging facilities, and mobile games with
chat facilities.
Purpose of the guidance
The purpose of the guidance is to:
• describe the types of moderation that can be used;
• inform organisations of all the issues they should take into account when
assessing the need for moderation of interactive services, and 
• inform organisations of the issues they should take into account in the
recruitment, training and supervision of moderators.
Basic requirements
If you or your organisation are providing, or intend to provide, a public interactive
communication service that is aimed at or very likely to attract children, you should:
• assess the potential risk to children, establish if it would be appropriate to use
moderation and, if so, decide the form of moderation to use;
• if using human moderation, assess the risk that a child abuser may apply for a
position and develop policies for the safer recruitment, training, management and
supervision of moderators to safeguard against this, and 
• make clear to users whether the interactive service is moderated, and if so, by
what means, either human or technical moderation.
Good Practice Guidance for Moderation of Interactive
Services for Children: Executive Summary
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The guidance
• The guidance provides information and recommendations for the moderation of
public interactive communication services aimed at or very likely to attract children
in the following areas:
o information and advice to users;
o risk assessment;
o recruitment;
o training;
o data security;
o management and supervision, and
o escalation procedures
• Gives examples of methods and patterns of behaviour (“grooming”) used by child
abusers to gain access to children via interactive communication services.
• Considers the relative merits of technical vs. human moderation and concludes
that technical moderation has not yet demonstrated the same level of protection
as human moderation. 
• Provides information about relevant legislation. 
Good Practice Guidance for Moderation of Interactive
Services for Children: Executive Summary
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1.1 Introduction
The Internet and communication technologies are transforming the way we live. Children
have embraced the new technologies enthusiastically and especially services where they
can interact with others, such as online instant messaging and interactive games.
As technology advances, we are beginning to experience media convergence as the
Internet and a range of content services can be accessed through different devices such
as personal computers, laptops, mobile phones, game consoles and the TV. This makes it
difficult for parents to supervise and monitor their child’s use of communication technology,
particularly as children’s take up of the latest communication technologies will often
exceed that of their parents.
Many companies and organisations recognise the challenges faced by parents and are
supporting them by providing safety tools and resources such as filtering software and
guidance about keeping safe online.
In 2003 the Home Office published Good Practice Guidance for the providers of Chat
Services, Instant Messaging and Web Based Services, which are aimed at or very likely to
attract children. The guidance, when discussing interactive services such as chatrooms,
Instant Messaging, Bulletin Boards and Discussion Forums made reference to the fact
that some of these services are “moderated” and some are not, see
(http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/crime-disorder/child-protection-taskforce)
Moderation is a process by which the provider of an interactive service e.g. the chat room
provider, or the person or company hosting a bulletin board, or interactive game takes
steps to eliminate undesirable or illegal contact or behaviour. The Guide to Web Based
Services was supportive of the use of moderation in services for children and young
people. It is also clear, however, that moderation is not an absolute guarantee of a child’s
safety while using a service. 
1.2 Aim and scope of the Guidance
Experience has shown that there are individuals who will exploit interactive services to
gain contact with children in order to “groom” and abuse them. It is, therefore, important
that public interactive communication services, which are aimed at or very likely to attract
children address the safety of children using these services. 
If you or your organisation are providing, or going to provide, a public interactive electronic
communication service that is aimed at or likely to attract children, you need to do the
following:
• assess the possible risks to children and whether it would be appropriate to use
moderation and, if so, decide what type of moderation to use;
• consider, if using human moderation, policies for the recruitment, training and
1 Introduction
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supervision of moderators and for the management of users’ personal data, and
• make clear to users whether your interactive service is moderated, and if so,
whether by human or technical moderation.
1.3 Using the Guidance
The guidance provides details of all the factors that should be considered in determining
whether moderation is appropriate and, if so, what it should comprise. It provides a
framework, based on current best practice, rather than an absolute model to be followed
rigidly irrespective of the circumstances. Interactive communication services are provided
in various and constantly evolving forms and are aimed at different communities.
Providers are responsible for how they deliver their services.  In determining the actions
they should take, providers will need to take into account the particular nature of their
services so that they can apply the relevant aspects of this guidance. It is for them to
judge whether and how far to apply any specific point in the guidance. Where they choose
not to, they will obviously want to assure themselves that their decision is justified, given
the nature of the service, and that it is consistent with child safety needs.
1.4 Types of interactive services 
This document refers frequently to interactive services. It is aimed at public interactive
communication services through which individuals can make contact and exchange
personal information with other users in a virtual public “space” such as but not limited to:
• message boards;
• chat services;
• text to screen;
• TV chat services;
• interactive games with chat or messaging facilities, and
• chat or game services that use ‘location services’ as part of the communication
facilities 1.
1.5 Blogging
It is noted that blogging, mo-blogging and “pseudo blogging” are still relatively new
phenomena, elements of which have many of the characteristics of discussion forums and
other kinds of spaces where interactive user generated content is created. 
Until clearer patterns emerge, it is not possible for us to offer any definitive guidance
about “blogging” but this may be something to be considered in the future.
1 Introduction
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1See Mobile Location Guidance website:  http.//www.mobilebroadbandgroup.com/social.htm
2.1 Children’s vulnerability
Children and young people are all vulnerable due to their young age and inexperience.
Many children who have been abused by people they have met on the Internet have
come from very loving, stable and positive backgrounds. It is children’s lack of experience
and their trusting nature that is exploited by abusers, especially when children are testing
out their identities and being given more freedom by their parents. 
Children and young people who are experiencing difficulties at home, school or with
friends and those who have disabilities may be particularly vulnerable, and they may seek
positive contact, support and friendship through interactive services online. Indeed many
children do find new friends on the Internet and sources of support which are positive and
offer less complicated relationships than those in their ordinary day-to-day lives.
Experience in the internet world has shown that some users, including children, behave in
more inappropriate and, at times, extreme ways online than they would offline. Some
children will engage in behaviour that may place them at risk, such as giving out personal
information about themselves and their family; some will act out fantasies by pretending to
be someone else; some will test out their sexual identities by engaging in cyber-flirting and
communicating in a sexual way, and generally acting out behaviours they would not do in
real life. In some instances, children and young people may themselves bully, harass and
abuse others.
2.2 “Grooming” of children for sexual abuse
Online environments have proved to be very attractive to child sex abusers who have
exploited them to contact, “groom” and abuse children.  “Grooming” is a process by which
a child abuser seeks to prepare a child for later abuse. Many child abusers use public
interactive spaces to find and meet children.  Abusers use a range of techniques to make
contact and befriend children. This can include the following:
• suggestions that a child leave a public chat room and move to private one-to-one
communication such as Instant Messaging;
• asking for personal details: name; address; telephone number; mobile number;
name of school or a photograph;
• asking where the home computer is located and/or about parental supervision of
Internet use;
• offering opportunities for modelling;
• promising meetings with pop idols or celebrities;
• offering cheap tickets to sports or pop concerts;
• offering material gifts including electronic games, music or software;
• suggesting quick and easy ways to make money;
2 Risks to Children
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• seeming eager to meet up offline;
• encouraging a child to share or talk about any difficulties they may be
experiencing, such as bullying or difficult relationships, and offering a sympathetic
and supportive response;
• bullying and intimidating behaviour such as threatening to expose the child by
contacting their parents to inform them of their child’s behaviour in the interactive
service, and
• telling the child that they know how to locate them, where they live, or where they
go to school.
Other “grooming” behaviours may be difficult to identify, since communication that forms
part of “grooming” may appear perfectly ordinary and innocent. 
For further information on this topic refer to the University of Lancashire Cyberspace
Research Centre 2 and Childnet International’s Chatdanger 3 provides real examples of
the “grooming” of children.
2.3 The “Grooming” process
Abusers go out of their way to entrap children, either quickly or over a long period of time.
They use sophisticated methods which both gain a child’s trust and lure them into a world
of secrecy. This process isolates children from sources of support such as friends, family
or parents. It is often achieved by sending children adult pornography or getting children
to send images of themselves, to lower their sexual inhibitions and make the child feel
guilty and ashamed. In some cases, the communication towards the child may involve no
explicit sexual content. It is aimed at simply gaining the child’s trust and confidence.
These entrapment processes ultimately have a corrupting effect on children. The end
result is that children can, and often do, feel ashamed, guilty and responsible for the
communication and abuse that has taken place. Children find it extremely difficult to seek
help or tell anyone what is happening to them.
Abusers can be adept at speaking the same language as children and become familiar
with their popular culture, hobbies, and interests such as sport, music, celebrities, pop
idols, or interactive games. Some abusers will watch a child in a public forum to gather
information about their interests over a period of time, so that they can more easily
manipulate a conversation with them at a later stage. 
Having made contact with one child, abusers may use that child to gain contact with other
children who are likely to be using the same online or messaging product, such as instant
messaging.
2 Risks to Children
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2  “Cyber Stalking, Abusive Cyber Sex and Online Grooming”, by Rachel O’Connell, Joanna Price and Charlotte Barrow,
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/host/cru/docs/NewCyberStalking.pdf (see also  “A Typology Of Child Cybersexploitation And Online Grooming
Practices.” by Rachel O’Connell).
3 website www.chatdanger.com
2.4 “Grooming” as a criminal offence
Whilst the “grooming” offence contained in s.15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 can only
take place when an adult intends to meet a child with the intention of committing a sexual
offence against them, either then or subsequently, other crimes can occur when a person
“grooms” a child. For example, s.10 of the Act makes it an offence to cause or incite a
child to engage in a sexual activity. This could occur where, for example, a person asks
the child to touch themselves or to photograph themselves (the latter may also be an
offence under the Protection of Children Act 1978). Where a pornographic picture is sent
to a child this could also be an offence under s.12, Sexual Offences Act 2003. It is
important that all moderators know what the law is but they should also be aware that they
should not try to investigate incidents themselves as this could prejudice a criminal
investigation. Moderators should secure evidence where possible (e.g. transcripts, IP
addresses, etc.) and contact the police immediately (see Annex A).
2.5  The Importance of moderation
In light of the risks to children described above, moderation is used to keep chat and public
interactive communication services safe for children and to provide a positive user experience.
Moderation can protect and educate children about safety and how to use interactive
services responsibly. It may also help communities take responsibility for running their
own virtual space. Communities themselves can give their members the experience of
learning how to take responsibility for the conduct of the group as a whole, by agreeing a
code of acceptable behaviour and then applying it. Where appropriate, at the right age,
and with the right safeguards, children’s groups may also learn the same skills in the
same way. 
2.6 Services not aimed at or not very likely to attract
children or young people
Although this document is intended for public interactive communication services aimed at
or very likely to attract children, the good practice points can be applied more generally to
ensure that staff or volunteers are familiar with the ways that interactive services can be
diverted for improper or illegal use, placing users at risk. For example, any service can be
used to exchange illegal images, or to make contacts for inappropriate purposes
unconnected with those of the service.
The Guidance may also be useful for those services aimed directly at vulnerable adults. 
Public interactive communication service providers will need to assess for themselves the
levels of risk to users of their service and how best to provide an appropriate level of
protection for their customers.
2 Risks to Children
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3.1 What is moderation? 
Moderation is an activity or process whereby a person or technical filter is responsible for
reviewing content posted by users. Moderation is usually undertaken according to an
agreed set of guidelines or policies to try to ensure users of the service are able to
interact safely, responsibly and appropriately.  These may be documented, for example, in
the service’s terms and conditions or “House Rules”. 
3.2 Technical or human moderation?
There are different ways in which the moderation function can be carried out: either
entirely by humans, or entirely by software based systems, or by a combination of both.
Technical moderation attempts to filter words and phrases that it has been programmed to
identify, telephone and email address formats, profanities and explicit language that may
cause offence. However, technical moderation used on its own has not yet demonstrated
that it can offer the same level of online child protection as human moderation, to combat
the sexual “grooming” of children.  For example, it can be outwitted by the creative use of
combinations of numbers, letters and punctuation marks. Furthermore, software based
solutions find it very difficult to pick up and interpret the context within personal
communication, for example, the subtleties of “grooming” behaviour.
However, technical interactive solutions which limit a participant’s communication to a
choice of pre-scripted words and phrases have proved to be effective in significantly
minimising risk.
3.3 Methods of human moderation
Moderation can be provided in a number of ways, and a combination of these can be
applied to interactive services.   These are as follows:
• pre-moderation: in a pre-moderated service all material supplied by users will be
reviewed by the moderator for suitability before it becomes visible to other users;
• post-moderation: in a post-moderated service, all material supplied by users will
be reviewed after it becomes visible to other users. The length of time between
the material becoming visible and it being checked may vary;
• sample moderation: a moderator may  “patrol” a number of spaces or
otherwise examine a sample of content but not all content is reviewed after
publication, and
• reactive moderation: in a service of this type moderation will take place only
after a request for intervention is made.
3 Assessing the Need for Moderation
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3.4  Undertaking a risk assessment of interactive
services 
It is important for public interactive communication providers to undertake a risk
assessment of their own service and the potential for harm to children in order to
decide what safeguards are necessary, including the use of moderation.
The following points are key areas for consideration:
• whether the service is specifically targeted at children and younger users;
• whether the service is very likely to attract children and younger users due to the
theme of the service, such as football or celebrities;
• whether the service enables users to have contact and interaction with strangers;
• the ease with which users can move from a public moderated area to a private
un-moderated area within the same service, and 
• whether users of the service are anonymous and identity is not verified or stored.
Having undertaken the risk assessment, it is necessary to decide which form of
moderation or combination of forms is appropriate.
3.5 The role of a “Moderator” 
There are a range of terms and terminology to describe different roles and responsibilities
within interactive environments but there is no industry wide agreed definition of a
moderator. The role a moderator undertakes will depend on the kind of service offered. 
For the purposes of this document, we have considered the following to be separate roles:
• moderator – this term is used to describe an individual who has a clear and
defined role to monitor and filter user-generated content, and who will intervene
where interactions break the “house rules” or cause concern. Moderators in some
services also take action against users who break the “house rules” or “code of
conduct”, ranging from sending them a warning through to denying the offending
user access to the service. Moderators may therefore have a position of trust and
authority over a child user and may also have access to data about users;
• host – this is a common term used to describe an individual in an interactive
environment who hosts a particular chat room forum or message board.
Sometimes their role is simply to meet and greet new members and offer
information about the interactive service and respond to questions from the new
user.  Sometimes they may also try to facilitate discussion in the interactive
service, which may have a particular theme or not.  They may or may not have
authority over a child user or access to data about users.
3 Assessing the Need for Moderation
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There are other terms, which may be used to describe people with these or similar roles,
for example “guide”, ”monitor”, “animator” or ”text-jockey”. A single individual may
sometimes undertake both roles of host and moderator. 
3.6 Human moderation
In general, there are three main approaches to the use of human moderators, each of
which has different implications for risk management and employment practice:
• sub-contractors
Moderators employed by a company which is contracted to provide moderation
services to another company; 
• volunteers
Users of the community service who have applied to the provider to become
moderators of the service and who might not be paid for their time, and
• in-house employees
Members of staff of the service provider who are specifically required to moderate
the service. 
In all these cases, moderators may work from home or from an office.
3 Assessing the Need for Moderation
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4.1 Background
It is important for users to be able to identify moderated services. Clear and accessible
information should be available to users about what they can expect from the service
offered, for example, that the service is moderated, the method of moderation used
(human or technical) and how it works.
It is also important for users to be able to contact a moderator for assistance should the
need arise.
4.2 Recommendations 
• Providers of public interactive communication services should provide clear and
prominent information to users about the kind of service offered, for example is
the chat room moderated or un-moderated? If moderated, what form of
moderation is used i.e. technical or human moderation and how does it work? 
• Parents need to be advised by interactive communication providers of the
importance of communicating with their children about their safety online on a
regular and consistent basis, as moderation or other safeguards are not foolproof.
• Children need to be regularly updated by interactive providers of the potential
risks to them. This should include what additional measures they can take, for
example, tools to block communication or record communication dialogue etc.
• Users of a moderated interactive service should have some means of contacting
the moderator for assistance if they have concerns or difficulties when using the
service.
4 Information and Advice for Users of Moderated Service
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5.1 Background
Following a series of public enquiries in the 1990s into child abuse in local authority
homes in the UK, there has been growing recognition of the potential for sex abusers to
gain employment with children in order to abuse and exploit them. The need for clear,
transparent and rigorous recruitment and management procedures within organisations
working with children was a key recommendation throughout the enquiries.
In recent years, cases of sexual abuse of children in other sectors such as the sport,
leisure and entertainment sectors and youth and faith-based organisations have extended
the need for child safety beyond child welfare organisations. Similarly, public interactive
communication services aimed at or likely to attract children are raising child safety
issues, both in terms of the posting of content and potential contact with child abusers. 
A considerable body of knowledge and evidence on this subject now exists. There is
general agreement that organisations need to make their professional environments safer
for children.
5.2 Recruitment and selection of human moderators
There is always a risk that any role that allows access to children will be attractive to child
abusers. In the case of public interactive communication services, access to children
could be obtained by becoming a moderator. This is because the role may provide: 
• opportunity for direct contact with children; 
• a perceived position of trust and authority of the moderator, and
• access to personal information about children. 
Moderators of public interactive communications services aimed at or very likely to attract
children should be subject to an appropriate Criminal Records Bureau check, be recruited
through suitable procedures, and be fully trained and supervised. 
Those who are responsible for moderators and hosts will need to assess the risk to
children based on:
• what opportunity for contact a moderator has with children through the service;   
• the extent to which they are in a position of trust and authority in relation to
children;
• what access, if any, they have to personal information about children, and
• how closely the process of moderation is supervised and managed.
5 Recruitment and Selection of Human Moderators
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5.3 Legislative Developments
There have been considerable legislative developments in recent years to improve the
protection of children from harm or abuse by those in positions of trust and authority.
These include the introduction of new abuse of trust offences in the Sexual Offences Act
2003. In 2002 an amendment was made to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
(Exceptions) Order allowing standard disclosures to be made through the Criminal
Records Bureau on persons in “employment which is concerned with the monitoring, for
the purpose of child safety, of communications by means of the internet.” 4
If moderators from outside England & Wales are to be employed equivalent checks should
be made with national agencies (if they exist) in other countries. The CRB may be able to
assist by providing details of what is available in a range of countries. For further
information contact the CRB Information Line on 0870 90 90 811 or visit their website on
www.crb.gov.uk. 
5 Recruitment and Selection of Human Moderators
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LEVELS OF CRB CHECK
Standard Disclosures contain details of all convictions on record (including “spent”
convictions), plus details of any cautions, reprimands or warnings. For positions
involving “working with children”, the Standard Disclosure will also give any information
contained on government department lists of people considered unsuitable to work with
children. These lists are held by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and
Department of Health (DoH). 
(Spent convictions - A person convicted of all but the most serious criminal offences
and who receives a sentence of no more than 2½ years in prison, benefits from the
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act if they are not convicted again during a specified period.
This is called the rehabilitation period. In general terms, the more severe a penalty is,
the longer the rehabilitation period. Once a rehabilitation period has expired and no
further offending has taken place, a conviction is considered to be “spent”.) 
Enhanced Disclosures involve an extra level of checking with local police force
records in addition to checks with the Police National Computer (PNC) and the
government department lists held by the DfES and DH, where appropriate. Local police
information can be contained on both copies of the Disclosure. It is up to the Chief
Constable of the relevant police force or forces to decide what, if any, information is
disclosed. Chief Constables can decide that some information may be relevant to the
position but do not wish the prospective employee to see the information, especially
where the release of such information would jeopardise an ongoing investigation. This
information will be sent separately to the person who countersigned the application only. 
4 We understand that further consideration will be given to the range and level of checks which should be available by which changes
are made.
5.4 Recommendations for recruitment and selection
Based on your risk assessment some or all of the following may be relevant:
• the appropriate CRB (Enhanced Disclosure if available) check should be
undertaken prior to an appointment to a moderation position involving working
with children. (It is recognised that delays at the CRB in processing applications
for Enhanced Disclosure prior to appointment can have significant public and
practical implications for the safer provision of services to children);
• advertisements for such positions should state that a CRB check will be made; 
• efforts should be made to adopt safer recruitment and selection procedures based
on the Warner Report – “Choosing with Care”.
• all prospective employees for moderation positions involving contact with children
should be interviewed face-to-face;
• advice on child care recruitment to reflect the importance of safeguarding children
(such as the ability to address the applicant’s attitude and suitability to work with
children) should be sought, for example, from the major children’s organisations. 
• Contracts, terms of employment or codes of conduct should include:
• boundaries of personal conduct;
• prohibition of inappropriate behaviour with children or vulnerable adults
who are users of the service, including making arrangements to have
personal communication or contact with them;
• prohibition of use of their moderator screen name outside of employment, and
• a confidentiality clause, prohibiting the misuse of company information
e.g. passing personal information to third parties.
• If moderators move from services not aimed at children to those which are aimed
at or very likely to attract children, they should go through the selection processes
appropriate for moderators working with children.
The Warner recommendations are UK based and safe recruitment procedures will also
vary from country to country.
5 Recruitment and Selection of Human Moderators
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The Warner Report
Defining the job - Employers should only recruit staff after preparing a job description
and a person specification clearly setting the competences ( i.e. skills and personal
attributes) and experience required to discharge satisfactorily the responsibilities of the job
description.
Advertising - Employers should ensure that all vacancies are advertised, usually
externally, and are open to competition (e.g. by use of websites or the press.)
Use of Public  Agencies - Employers should require any agencies to adopt selection and
appointment procedures as rigorous as those applied to directly employed staff.
Pre-selection information - Employers should require applicants for posts to supply
information prior to selection, in a signed document, including: proof of identity; any
criminal convictions and whether they have ever been charged with a criminal offence and
the outcome; any other relevant information.
Selection Methodology - Employers should use a variety of selection methods as an
appointment based upon just one interview by a large panel is more likely to result in a
wrong appointment. Selection methods could include written exercises, preliminary
interviews, visits to the office and aptitude tests.
Employers should use preliminary interviews as a standard part of a establishing a fuller
picture of the character and attitudes of short-listed candidates.
References - References, especially from the current employer, provide key information
about the job applicant and employers need to ensure that their procedures require these
to be supplied. Employers should require candidates when applying to provide a full
employment history, including periods of unemployment with dates (to the nearest month)
and the names and addresses of previous employers.
Employers should always approach an applicant's present employer; should tell applicants
that they reserve the right to approach any previous employer or line manager about a
short listed candidate's character and performance before interview; should seek written
references on the basis that referees have the job description and person specification
and are encouraged to comment frankly on short listed candidate's strengths and
weakness in relation to those two documents; and where necessary should explore any
aspects of references by telephone with a current or past employer.   
Final Decisions -  Employers should ensure that those taking a final decision on
employment of an employee should have available to them and use all the information
about candidates from earlier parts of the selection process; and that they are free to
explore areas of doubt and concern to discharge their overriding responsibility to make
safe and competent appointments.
Employers should only offer appointments after completing police checks against central
government lists and verification of birth certificates and educational / professional
qualifications; and should allow no unsupervised access to children before
completion of all checks.
(References ; Warner Report – “Choosing with Care” ; Utting Report – “People like Us”)
5.5  Recruitment and selection for moderators outside
the UK
It is accepted that communication technologies operate on a global basis and companies
may run their operations across a number of different territories. Vetting procedures and
standards in other jurisdictions may not match those that exist in the UK. For organisations
providing public interactive communication services in these circumstances, it is
recommended that, in whatever country they recruit or employ moderators, they use
whatever systems are available to them in order to match the UK's recruitment standards
as closely as possible. Extra care should be taken in following up references and carrying
out checks on a person’s background. 
The Criminal Records Bureau is not able to conduct criminal records checks overseas.
Some countries, including most in the EU, have arrangements to provide information to
prospective employers upon request. The level of information varies from country to
country. Many countries use the criminal record as a starting point. However, what
constitutes a criminal offence will depend upon the legal framework in each country. It is
also worth noting that in some countries only judgements given by criminal courts are
recorded but in others decisions by administrative authorities are included. Some
countries also operate a “disqualification from working with children” system.
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6.1 Training to cover key areas
The training of moderators needs to cover a number of key areas so they have an
awareness of relevant issues and policies and can operate effectively.
It is not critical whether training is provided in-house or by use of outside expertise.  What
is important is that the training prepares the moderator to apply their knowledge
effectively. The training should reflect the realities of what is possible for the moderator in
the particular environment.
Based on your risk assessment some or all of the following may be relevant:
6.2 Role of the moderator
Training should cover:
• understanding when and how moderators are expected to intervene, and
• the activities that are prohibited to moderators, for example, unauthorised
communication or meeting with service users, together with the reasons for such
prohibitions.
6.3 Escalation procedures 
Training should cover:
• the use of an agreed escalation procedure (see 8.4), and
• how, when and why they should refer particular types of incident and to whom a
report should be made.
6.4  Recognition of responses
All moderators should have a reasonable level of awareness of child protection issues.
The depth to which this is necessary will vary with the level of service being provided.
Also, the type of knowledge needed will vary: for example, a person post-moderating a
message board will need a different mix of knowledge from a person moderating a teens’
chat room.
6.5  Usage patterns/ behaviour worth investigating further
Experience has demonstrated that there are some behaviour patterns which, while not
immediately obvious as signs of abuse, may be worth further investigation (for example
“grooming”). 
Case studies can be useful in training moderators, to demonstrate both the ease with
which contact can be made and the severity of the harm that can result.
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6.6 Child abuse
Training should be provided on:
• the full range of behaviour that constitutes child abuse. The issue of “grooming”
should be specifically addressed, including the signs that may warrant intervention
(e.g. invitations to meet off-line or requests for personal details.)  Moderators and
supervisors should be aware of the relevant criminal law applicable to their work
(see Annex A);
• child development issues and associated behaviours that can be expected from
different age groups, for example early teens will be forming and testing their
sexual identities and may use explicit sexual language and engage in flirting. 
6.7 Vulnerable people
Training should be provided to enable moderators to recognise and respond appropriately
to users of their service who are vulnerable or at risk. Where, for example, a user appears
to be in need of counselling or support, there should be a clear escalation procedure. This
is important with any user, but is particularly important when the moderator believes the
user may be a child.
6.8 Bullying/harassment
Training should be provided to enable moderators to recognise behaviour which
constitutes bullying and harassment, which in some cases might amount to criminal
harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997– (see Annex A).
6.9 Illegal or Harmful Content
Training should be provided so moderators can recognise potentially illegal meterial (such
as indecent photographs of children) and material inappropriate for children, for example,
adult pornography.  
6.10 Awareness of the risk to children
Training of moderators should seek to raise awareness of the serious risk of harm to
children posed by child abusers who use interactive services sometimes pretending they
themselves are children.
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6.11 Identifying abusive behaviour
Training needs to develop the ability of moderators to identify behaviour which constitutes
child abuse and which is possible on the service they are moderating, for example,
encouraging a child to share inappropriate images.
6.12 Advising users
Where moderators have direct interactions with users, their training should include the
most recent advice on staying safe online so they are able to promote safe practice
amongst users. 
6.13 Updating the moderation
Training should include advice on what to do if the moderator feels that the procedures
and practices they follow no longer seem appropriate for the user group or the service that
is being delivered, especially where large numbers of children are using a service not
designed for them. 
6.14 Concerns arising during training
If the response to training gives a company cause for concern about a particular trainee,
the company should be in a position to  take steps such as to limiting the services that
person can moderate to those which exclude children, imposing particular supervision, or
reconsidering their continued employment.
6.15 Prohibited Activities
Training should address the activities that are prohibited to moderators, for example,
unauthorised communication or meeting with service users, together with the reasons for
such prohibitions.
6.16 Escalation Procedures
Moderators should be trained in the use of an agreed escalation procedure.
Whether moderation is done internally (e.g. by a content provider) or externally (e.g. by a
moderation company), it should be clear who has responsibility for reporting an incident to
the relevant authorities, at what stage and in what form. This may involve the police e.g.
Virtual Global Task Force (www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com) or the IWF (www.iwf.org.uk).
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7 Personal Information and Data Security
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7.1 Personal information 
Risk management in providing a moderation service is necessary because of the risk of
information being misused to contact or maintain contact with a child outside the
moderation environment.
If the actual physical environment, including location of computers or storage of data is
insecure e.g. in an open access office, there is a risk that unauthorised individuals may
gain access to users’ personal details, including email, telephone number and address.   
If data systems are vulnerable to hacking, or operated by people outside the control of the
service operator, there is the potential that the security of users’ personal data could be at
risk.
Providers must be aware of the potential misuse of personal data internally by people who
have legitimate access to data, but who use this data to initiate contact with children,
either to make inappropriate contact themselves or to pass the data to third parties
outside the organisation.
7.2  Recommendations for data security
• all organisations that collect personal information need to comply with the Data
Protection Act 1998;
• in accordance with the DPA, organisations holding personal data need to appoint
a Data Controller;
• access to personal data about users should be restricted to those authorised by
the data controller;
• a record should be kept of who has access to personal data and, so far as is
technically practical, when they have accessed it. If IP addresses are recorded, a
date and time stamp should be used. Interactive service providers who have
employed a moderation company will ordinarily be the data owner (rather than the
moderation company) unless agreed otherwise;
• policies and procedures should be devised to address data security in work
places. This could include such things as prevention of unauthorised access to
systems and physical locations where data is stored and processed, and
• policies and procedures should be devised for situations where moderators work
from home, as it is difficult to manage users’ personal data in these situations.
Providers of moderation services will need to be especially vigilant to comply with
the DPA.
8.1 Management, supervision and accountability
Experience in a variety of settings including children’s homes, nurseries, youth work and
faith and educational contexts has shown the importance of informed management
systems for the protection of children. 
Professional standards about management, supervision and accountability have evolved,
particularly in the last 15 years, following many child abuse inquiries into the systematic
abuse of children by staff in professional settings. As far as possible, professional
childcare standards should be incorporated into the public interactive communications
services environment to ensure the safety and protection of children. Because of the
crucial role managers play, they need to be fully informed of the child protection issues
involved in the operation of interactive services.
Operators should also be aware of the Good Practice Guidance for Providers of Chat
Services, Instant Messaging and Web Based Services.1
8.2 Referral of an employee to Protection of Children
Act 1999 list
In the UK employers in organisations involved in working with children have a duty to refer
an employee who has placed a child at risk to the authorities for possible inclusion on the
‘Protection of Children Act List’ (POCA).
Moderators who harm or place a child at risk during the course of their employment
should be referred to the POCA List which contains the names of individuals who have
been considered unsuitable to work with children – because in previous employment they
have either harmed or placed a child at risk, even if no criminal proceedings have taken
place.  
It is a criminal offence for those on the POCA list to seek employment with children and it
is an offence for an employer knowingly to employ them in such a role (see Annex B for
more details).
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1 http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operational-policing/ho_model.pdf
8.3 Recommendations for the Management and
Supervision of Moderators
Based on your risk assessment some or all of the following may be relevant:
• all moderated services should have effective policies and management systems in
place for moderators;
• procedures should be in place to ensure moderation practice which fosters
awareness of child safety and protection;
• managers should be aware of child protection issues and their responsibilities in
respect of protection of children;
• managers should ensure moderators are aware of their responsibilities and of
policies and procedures;
• a record should be kept of which moderator was responsible for a service at any
particular time in order to facilitate investigations of any complaints after the fact; 
• If moderators are working at home, management and supervision measures
should be carefully considered to take account of the added difficulty of
supervision at a distance. Service providers will need to consider a range of
measures, which might include instant messenger, video conferencing, and
telephone contact, to ensure:
a) the moderator is who they should be; 
b) the work station is set up in a way to keep users’ data secure, and 
c) the organisation can monitor what the moderator does.
Managers should supervise the work of moderators so that: 
• managers can evaluate the quality and consistency of the moderation being
provided;
• they are able to monitor the impact on moderators, particularly for stress, burnout
or behaviours that may give rise to concern for the staff member or for safety and
security of the service; 
• they can raise any specific concerns relating to users or patterns of behaviour
observed in the course of their work, and these can be escalated to senior
management or law enforcement in accordance with escalation procedures, and
• if there are concerns that an employee or former employee is a risk to or has
harmed a child, consideration should be given to referring the case to the
authorities for possible inclusion on the Protection of Children Act (POCA) list.
(See Annex B)
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8.4 Escalation procedures
Moderators who look after public interactive communication services aimed at or likely to
attract children should know what to do, whom to refer concerns to, when and how, if they
see risky behaviour on the service for which they are responsible. To do this, a clear
escalation procedure should be agreed in advance, to avoid confusion and delay.  
8.5 Recommendations for Escalation Procedures
Based on your risk assessment some or all of the following may be relevant:
• a clear escalation policy should be established in advance;
• moderators should be familiar with the escalation policy and should know what to
do, who to refer to, when and how, if they observe risky behaviour on the service;
• moderators should be familiar with the service’s “house rules” or terms and
conditions or other published code of conduct for users;
• moderators should be particularly familiar with how the service’s house rules etc.
apply to behaviour which is risky for children, for example, an attempt to publish
personal information or to arrange a face-to-face meeting with a stranger;
• moderators should know what to do if a user breaks the house rules etc and what
level of sanction to apply if it is their responsibility, or who to refer the problem to;
• moderators should know at what stage an incident should be referred to their
supervisor or manager and in what form;
• moderators should have access to guidlines on how evidence of a suspected
crime should be captured and for how long it should be stored,
• whether moderation is done internally (e.g. by a content provider) or externally
(e.g. by a moderation company) it should be clear to the moderator who has
responsibility for reporting an incident to the relevant authorities, at what stage
and in what form. This may involve the police, the IWF or children’s charities;
• the person responsible for reporting an incident to the relevant authorities should
know to whom to report the incident and how to do it, and
• it may be necessary to arrange out-of-hours contact if the moderated service is
available outside office hours. 
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The Criminal Law affecting personal interactions in
interactive services.
It is important to reiterate the general principle that an action that is illegal if committed
offline is also illegal if it is committed online through a public interactive communication
service.  This does not only apply to acts such as distributing illegal material, but also, for
example, to online behaviour which may cause harm because it amounts to a course of
harassment. Inciting someone to commit an offence is no less an offence simply because
it is done through a computer or mobile phone. Each case will be different and it is
impossible to set out in a document of this sort a definitive explanation of the law.
Nevertheless, it is hoped this brief and general guide to a few relevant offences will be
helpful. No-one using an interactive service should be under the illusion that the criminal
law does not apply to what they do.
Communications Act 2003
Section 127(1) provides that it is an offence if any person sends a message or other
matter by means of a public electronic communications network which is grossly offensive,
indecent, obscene or menacing, or if a person causes any such message or matter to be sent.
Section 127(2) provides that a person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing
annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another he sends or causes to be sent
by means of a public electronic communications network a message he knows to be false,
or persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network.  
These provisions allow prosecution of nuisance or silent telephone callers in the online
world but could apply to similar behaviour committed on any public communications
network. The offences carry a penalty of a maximum of 6 months' imprisonment and/or a
level five fine (£5000).
Protection from Harassment Act 1997
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was introduced primarily to tackle stalking but
the offence of harassment extends to any form of persistent conduct which causes
another alarm or distress. Section 4 of the Act makes it a criminal offence for a person to
pursue a course of conduct which he knows, or ought to know, will cause another to fear
violence.  This offence will catch the most serious cases where behaviour is so
threatening that victims fear for their safety.  It carries a penalty of a maximum of 5 years'
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.  
Section 2 of the Act provides for a further offence in cases of a course of conduct which
the perpetrator knows, or ought to know, will cause harassment.  This offence will catch
the sort of persistent conduct which, although it may not make the victim fear that violence
will be used, nonetheless can have devastating effects.  It carries a penalty of a maximum
of 6 months' imprisonment and/or a level five fine.  A court sentencing someone convicted
Annex A
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of an offence under either of these sections may also impose a restraining order
prohibiting specified forms of behaviour.  Breach of a restraining order is a criminal
offence punishable by up to 5 years’ imprisonment.
In addition to these criminal offences, section 3 of the Act provides a civil remedy which
enables a victim to seek an injunction against a person who is harassing them or may be
likely to do so.
Other public order laws designed to deal with online behaviour may also be applicable to
behaviour in public interactive communications services, depending on the circumstances.
Protection of Children Act 1978
The 1978 Act essentially prohibits creation or distribution of indecent photographs of
children, in whatever form. Proscribed activities are taking, making, permitting to be taken
or made, distribution or showing, possessing with intent to possess or show, or publishing
an advertisement for such photographs. The maximum penalty is 10 years imprisonment.
Simple possession of such a photograph is an offence under s.160 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1988, and carries a 5 year maximum penalty.  Although there are defences specified
in the Act, it is unlikely that any of these could apply to images knowingly sent over a
public interactive communications service, so anything discovered in the course of
moderation which appears to be an indecent photograph of a child needs to be reported
to the IWF and/or the police so it can be properly investigated.  
A Memorandum of Understanding concerning the defence to “making” an indecent
photograph of a child provided by s.46 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is available on the
CPS website.
Sexual Offences Act 2003
Section 10: Causing or Inciting a child to engage in sexual activity.
This makes it an offence for a person to cause or incite a child to engage in sexual
activity. It is a wide provision covering all sorts of sexual behaviour, including seeking to
get a child to perform a sex act on itself. For example, if A asks B (a child) to touch herself
or to pose in her underwear before a webcam, a jury may consider this to be a sexual act.
What amounts to a “sexual” activity will be decided by the court but section 78 of the Act
defines “sexual” in such a way that motives of an offender and the circumstances of the
act are relevant.
The offence does not require any element of coercion, and is committed even where the
child apparently consents to performing the act. There is no requirement that the offender
receives sexual gratification from the act although this is likely to occur in the vast majority
of cases, simply that the offender intentionally causes or incites the activity.
The offence has a maximum penalty of fourteen years imprisonment.
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Section 12: Causing a child to watch a sexual act
This makes it an offence for a person aged 18 or over to intentionally cause a child aged
under 16, for the purposes of his own sexual gratification, to watch a third person
engaging in sexual activity, or to look at an image of a person engaging in a sexual act.
The act can be live or recorded, and there is no need for the child to be in close physical
proximity to the sexual act.  Examples of this offence would be where a person, for the
purposes of his own sexual gratification, enables a child to watch two people have sex,
either in the physical presence of the activity or remotely, for instance via a webcam; or
where someone invites a child to watch a pornographic film or sends a child indecent
images over the internet.
The offence does not require any element of coercion, though it may be a factor in some
cases.  The offence is committed even where the child apparently consents to watching a
sexual act.  In order for an offence to be committed, the adult must act for his own sexual
gratification.  This ensures that, adults showing children sex education material, either in a
school or other setting, will not be liable for this offence. 
The offence has a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment.
Section 15: Meeting a child following sexual “grooming” 
This makes it an offence for a person aged 18 or over to meet intentionally, or to travel
with the intention of meeting a child under the age of 16 in any part of the world, if he has
met or communicated with that child on at least two prior occasions and intends to commit
a “relevant offence” against that child, either at the time of the meeting or on a subsequent
occasion.  
The section is intended to cover situations where an adult establishes contact with a child
and gains the child’s trust so that he can arrange to meet the child for the purpose of
committing a “relevant offence” against the child (essentially this means sex offences).
The contact with the child may take place through communications on the internet, but
equally, it could for example, be through meetings, letters, text messages or telephone
conversations.  The police may become aware of the contact between the offender and
the child by a number of means, for example, reporting by the child, or by concerned
parents/teachers.
An offence is not committed if the adult reasonably believes the child to be 16 or over. In
cases where the defendant claims to have reasonably believed that the child was 16 or
over, it is for the prosecution to prove that he held no such belief or that his belief was not
reasonably held.
The initial communications between the adult and child may have a sexually explicit
content, for example, conversations about sexual acts he would like the child to engage in
or sending the child indecent images.  However, this need not be the case.  Prior
communications could, for example, involve: an adult giving a child music lessons or
running a youth club the child attends; an adult serving sweets to a child in a sweet shop;
meeting incidentally through a friend, or chatting about innocent subjects.
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It is for prosecutors to prove the intent of the adult to engage in unlawful sexual behaviour
with the child on the occasion of the meeting or on a subsequent occasion.  Proof could
be derived from the communications between the adult and the child before the meeting,
for example, from conversations about the nature of the sexual activity that is planned.
Such evidence might be obtained by examining the contents of e-mails or letters which
have been sent or received, or from the transcripts of chat room conversations which
might have been logged either on an individual’s computer or on the computer of an
internet service provider.  Evidence may also be drawn from other circumstances, such as
the adult travelling to the meeting with ropes, condoms and lubricants.
The intended “relevant offence” does not have to take place for the offence to be
committed.  It is sufficient for the adult to travel to meet the child with the intent to commit
a “relevant offence” against the child.  The adult might intend to commit the “relevant
offence” on that occasion, or on a future occasion. An example of the latter would be
where a person communicates with the child over the internet, expressing his intention
that they engage in sexual activity.  He then arranges to meet the child for the first time in
a public place, with the intention of meeting her again at a later date in private, at which
point he plans to have sex with her. In this example a section 15 offence would have been
committed at the point at which the adult sets out for the first meeting.
Either the meeting or at least part of the travel to the meeting must take place in England,
Wales or Northern Ireland. However, the adult’s previous meetings or communications
with the child can have taken place anywhere in the world and it would also be possible
for the person to intend to engage in sexual activity with a child in another jurisdiction.
In some cases it might be appropriate to charge a person with an attempt to commit the
offence rather than the offence itself. For example, where an undercover policeman takes
the place of the child at the meeting in a covert operation, the defendant could be charged
with attempting to commit the offence, assuming the necessary intent could be proved.
The attempted offence has the same penalty as the offence itself.  The offence has a
maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.
Risk of sexual harm orders (RSHOs)
Sections 123 to 129 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provide for a new civil preventative
order, the risk of sexual harm order (RSHO).  This is a new civil order that can be applied
for by the police against any person thought to pose a sexual risk to children aged under
16.  The orders originally arose out of the work of the Home Office Task Force on Child
Protection on the Internet which identified a gap in the law concerning the “grooming” of
children by paedophiles.
A chief officer of police may apply for a “risk of sexual harm order” in respect of a person
aged 18 or over if it appears to the chief officer that there is reasonable cause to think it is
necessary, and that person has on at least two occasions done one of the acts listed. 
These are:
(a) engaging in sexual activity involving a child or in the presence of a child;
(b) causing or inciting a child to watch a person engaging in sexual activity or to look at a
moving or still image that is sexual;
(c) giving a child anything that relates to sexual activity or contains a reference to such
activity, and
(d) communicating with a child, where any part of the communication is sexual.
It is not necessary for the defendant to have a prior conviction for a sexual offence.  The
court can make an order if it is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting
children generally or any individual child from harm from the defendant. The order entitles
the court to prohibit the defendant from doing anything described in it.  The minimum
duration of an order is 2 years.  The order is intended as a preventative measure to deter
unlawful or harmful sexual activity with, or conduct towards, a child.  Breach of an order,
without reasonable excuse, is a criminal offence that is tried either summarily or on
indictment with a maximum penalty on indictment of five years imprisonment.
The RSHO should not be used as a substitute for prosecution.  The requirement that an
order is necessary to prevent serious harm means that those with a genuine and
benevolent interest in children (such as those providing advice on sexual health matters)
should not be caught by the legislation. 
A person subject to a RSHO will not be subject to the notification requirements in Part 2 of
the Sexual Offences Act but breach of a RSHO will be a criminal offence and will entail
compliance with the notification requirements.
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The criminal law affecting individuals considered
unsuitable to work with children.
Protection of Children Act 1999
All child care organisations (as defined by the Act) have a statutory duty to refer names for
possible inclusion to the Protection of Children Act list of those individuals considered
unsuitable to work with children.  Any other organisation may refer names for possible
inclusion on the list. This applies where a worker in a regulated position has been
dismissed, resigned, or moved away from work with children, on grounds of misconduct
which harmed a child or placed a child at risk of harm.
A child care organisation is defined in the Act as an organisation:
• which is concerned with the provision of accommodation, social services or health
care services to children or the supervision of children;
• whose activities are regulated by or by virtue of any prescribed enactment, and
• which fulfils such other conditions as may be prescribed.
Unless they fall into this category through some other role, it is unlikely that companies
offering interactive services will be classed as child care organisations. They may
nevertheless make referrals to the list in the circumstances set out.
Regulated positions include
• a position whose normal duties include caring for, training, supervising or being in
sole charge of children, and
• a position whose normal duties involve unsupervised contact with children under
arrangements made by a responsible person.
Once a referral has been received, the decision as to whether to include a person
on the list is made by the Secretary of State. There is an avenue of appeal to the
Care Standards Tribunal. In order for the Secretary of State to go on to confirm a person
on the POCA list he must form the opinion that:
• the employer reasonably considered the individual to be guilty of misconduct
(whether or not in the course of his employment) which harmed a child or placed
a child at risk of harm, and
• that the person is now unsuitable to work with children.
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Details that should ideally be sent with a referral:
• full name, date of birth of the individual;
• national Insurance number (if available);
• confirmation that the individual occupied a child care post or “regulated position”;
• full details of the alleged misconduct;
• detailed explanation about how - by his/her misconduct - the individual harmed a
child or placed a child at risk of harm;
• details of the investigation carried out to date - and their conclusions - including
copies of all relevant papers (including statements, notes of interviews, minutes of
meetings and minutes/notes of disciplinary hearings) and details of the
organisation’s disciplinary procedure;
• details of the action taken against the individual - has he/she been suspended,
dismissed or transferred from a child care position etc;
• Information of any police involvement (or the involvement of any other agency);
• details of proposed further action - i.e. dates for disciplinary hearings, timetables
on further investigations etc, and
• any other information considered relevant to the circumstances of the alleged
misconduct.
Contact Address:
Children’s Safeguarding Operations Unit (POCA),
Ground Floor Area E,
Mowden Hall, Staindrop Road,
Darlington,
DL3 9BG
01325 392 030
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